Credit Chains and Bankruptcy Propagation in Production Networks by Stiglitz, Joseph E. et al.




URL: httwww.elsevier.com/locate/jedcCredit chains and bankruptcy propagation in
production networks
Stefano Battistona,, Domenico Delli Gattib, Mauro Gallegatic,
Bruce Greenwaldd, Joseph E. Stiglitzd
aChair of Systems Design, ETH Zurich, Kreuzplatz 5, 8032 Zurich, Switzerland
bInstitute of Quantitative Methods and Economic Theory, Catholic University of Milan, Largo Gemelli 1,
20123 Milan, Italy
cDepartment of Economics, Universita´ Politecnica delle Marche, Piazz.le Martelli 8, 60121 Ancona, Italy
dColumbia Business School, Columbia University, Uris Hall, 3022 Broadway, New York, NY 10027, USA
Available online 29 March 2007Abstract
We present a simple model of a production network in which ﬁrms are linked by
supplier–customer relationships involving extension of trade–credit. Our aim is to identify the
minimal set of mechanisms which reproduce qualitatively the main stylized facts of industrial
demography, such as ﬁrms’ size distribution, and, at the same time, the correlation, over time
and across ﬁrms, of output, growth and bankruptcies. The behavior of aggregate variables can
be traced back to the direct ﬁrm–ﬁrm interdependence. In this paper, we assume that the
number of ﬁrms is constant and the network has a periodic static structure. But the framework
allows further extensions to investigate which network structures are more robust against
domino effects and, if the network is let to evolve in time, which structures emerge
spontaneously, depending on the individual strategies for orders and delivery.
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The basic framework in mainstream economic theory, i.e., the Arrow–Debreu
general equilibrium model, rests on the assumption that individuals take decisions in
isolation – they play a ‘game against nature’ – using only the information contained
in a general market signal such as the price vector. In such a framework, interaction
and co-ordination occur only indirectly through prices. Direct interaction among
agents is ruled out by construction. Moreover, exchange takes place only when
equilibrium prices have been discovered so that out-of-equilibrium dynamics due to
exchange at ‘false prices’ are ruled out by assumption and individual choices are
always consistent: the failure of co-ordination which is likely to arise in a
decentralized market economy is simply assumed away (Leijonhuvfud, 1992, 1993;
Hahn and Solow, 1995).
Prices are undoubtedly a fundamental part of the picture, but the price mechanism
can work well only if information is perfect and markets are complete. If this is
not the case, i.e., if the future is uncertain, we cannot ignore direct interactions
which assume the form of co-ordination mechanisms that arise in spatio-temporal
way – i.e., supply chains, communication, imitation, learning, trust and credit
relationships. Credit is extended by one ﬁrm to another (trade credit), by one bank to
another (interbank credit) and by banks to ﬁrms (loans). In other words, there
is a network of production and credit relationships among ﬁrms, among banks
and between ﬁrms and banking system. In this context, complex patterns
of heterogeneous agents’ interactions at the microlevel lead to the emergence
of statistical regularity at the macroeconomic level through a self-organized
process.
The structure and macroeconomic impact of a production network has been
studied for instance by Bak et al. (1993). As for credit, the role of bank loans has
been extensively dealt with in the enormous literature on ﬁrms–banks relationships
(for an overview of the main issues, see Stiglitz and Greenwald, 2003). An interesting
new line of research has emphasized the role of interbank credit in determining
phenomena of ﬁnancial contagion (Allen and Gale, 2000). Last but not least, trade
credit is an important part of the network of credit relationships. In the U.S., trade
credit represented one-half of the short term liabilities of the corporate sector in 2004
(Boissay, 2006). Moreover, trade credit is largely used as collateral in bank
borrowing, especially by small and medium sized ﬁrms. In the U.S., lines of credit
secured by accounts receivables represented approximately one quarter of total bank
loans in 1998 (Klapper, 2001). In Italy, loans secured by receivables were 22% of
total loans and 54% of short term loans in 2002 (Omiccioli, 2005). In the theoretical
literature, Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) emphasize the role of trade credit as a
propagation mechanism. So far, however, the issue has been underresearched, both
at the theoretical and empirical levels, with the notable exception of Boissay (2006).1
The focus of the present paper is on the role of ﬁrms’ network in determining
macroeconomic outcomes such as the agglomeration over time of production1See also Petersen and Rajan (1997), Elligsen and Burkart (2002), Lee and Stowe (1993).
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which N ﬁrms are organized in M production levels. Each ﬁrm at a certain level is
supplied by a subset of ﬁrms in the upper level (suppliers) and supplies a subset of the
ﬁrms in the lower level (customers). In other words, the ﬁrm is a customer (of
suppliers located in the upper level) and a supplier (of customers located in the lower
level) at the same time. The bottom level consists of retailers, i.e., ﬁrms that sell in the
consumer market. The top level consists of ﬁrms that provide primary goods to the
other ﬁrms. Firms are connected by means of two mechanisms: (i) the output of
supplier ﬁrms is an input for customer ﬁrms; (ii) supplier ﬁrms extend trade credit to
customers.
In each period, ﬁrms in the bottom level (retailers) determine their desired
output on the basis of the demand coming from the consumers and their produ-
ction capacity, and send orders to the upper level. Firms in the upper level, in
turn, determine their desired output on the basis of the demand coming from
their customers (i.e., the retailers). In sequence one after another, all production
levels do the same, up to the ﬁrst level. At this point, production starts in the ﬁrst
level and proceeds one level after the other according to the established production
plans. When production reaches the bottom level, products are sold to the
consumers and a sequence of payments is activated going from the ﬁnal consumers
to retailers, from retailers to producers and so on up to the providers of primary
goods.
At each level, in each period, a ﬁrm as a supplier is paid for its product by its
customers and only afterwards pays the cost of inputs to the suppliers as a customer.
In a sense, therefore, the suppliers extend trade credit to the ﬁrm for an amount
equal to 100% of the cost of supplies. If cost exceeds the proceeds from sales, the
ﬁrm goes bankrupt and does not pay its suppliers. In this case, the ﬁrm stops
production and is replaced by a new ﬁrm (so that the number of ﬁrms remains
constant). The trade credit contract is only implicitly sketched: we neither design the
optimal trade credit scheme nor look for the optimal amount of trade credit a
customer ﬁrm should require. These issues are left to further extensions and
developments of the present framework. In this paper, we focus instead on different
strategies that ﬁrms can follow to allocate credit to suppliers and fulﬁll orders from
customers. Weisbuch and Battiston (2007) have recently studied another model of
production network developed in a similar framework. Their model is somehow
simpler, as it does not include credit, and it is investigated in relation to geographical
economics issues.
In our model, if a ﬁrm is unable to reimburse debt, it goes bankrupt. In principle,
bankruptcy can be of two types. Bankruptcy of the ﬁrst type may be triggered by an
unexpected shock to revenues or to costs so that average revenue turns out to be ‘too
low’ with respect to average cost. In this paper, we model the unexpected shock to
revenues along the lines of Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993) as a bad realization of the
(random) relative price of the ﬁrm. Bankruptcy of the second type occurs when a
supplier at a certain level is not paid by the customer at the lower level. This second
type of bankruptcy can be dealt with only in the context of network economies such
as the one considered in the present paper. In our context, the failure to fulﬁll debt
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become unable in turn to pay its own suppliers located in the upper level, which may
lead to a chain of similar failures (domino effect) and in extreme cases result in
bankruptcy avalanches. When a ﬁrm goes bankrupt, in fact, the probability of
bankruptcy in connected ﬁrms increases, yielding clustered ﬂuctuations in the
number of failing ﬁrms. In other words, a single bankruptcy (of the ﬁrst type)
may have systemic repercussions through an avalanche of bankruptcies of the
second type.
Previous multi-agent models of ﬁnancial fragility (Delli Gatti et al., 2005) have
been able to reproduce stylized facts of ﬁrms’ demography and aggregate output in a
framework in which ﬁrms go bankrupt because of unexpected price or cost
ﬂuctuations. However, such models incorporate only the indirect interaction among
ﬁrms that takes place through the endogenous determination of the interest rate on
bank loans. Notice that in this case, a single bankruptcy of the ﬁrst type – due, for
instance, to an unexpected negative shock to revenues – may have systemic
repercussions. In Delli Gatti et al. (2005), in fact, the banking system reacts to the
above-mentioned bankruptcy of the ﬁrst type by restraining the supply of credit and
pushing up the interest rate. The increase in the interest rate may trigger and
avalanche of bankruptcies. These avalanches, however, are of the ﬁrst type, i.e., they
are due to an unexpected cost push engendered by the interest rate hike.
Such an approach is similar to the ‘mean ﬁeld approximation’ in statistical
physics, which consists in supposing that each unit of the system is interacting with
an average unit. The mean ﬁeld approximation yields useful predictions when units
interact in an all-to-all fashion and are not too heterogeneous; otherwise, the
dynamics of the system may be qualitatively different from the mean ﬁeld prediction.
In the present framework, we emphasize the role of direct local interaction among
ﬁrms in the generation of bankruptcy avalanches. In a production network,
interactions are local and units are highly heterogeneous indeed.
It is worth mentioning that in (Delli Gatti et al., 2005) the evolution of the net
worth of ﬁrms can be very roughly approximated as a set of multiplicative stochastic
processes (MSP). The results on the ﬁrms’ size distribution are then consistent with
the well known fact that power law distributions can be obtained by combining an
MSP with a speciﬁc additional ingredient – either a reﬂecting barrier or additive
noise or a stochastic resetting of the size (Kesten, 1973; Biham et al., 1998; Sornette,
1998; Nirei and Souma, 2003). Also in the model presented in this paper, it is
possible to show that the evolution of the net worth of ﬁrms is related to a set of
MSP. However, this issue will be developed in future work.
Overall, we proceed by identifying a minimal set of mechanisms that reproduce
qualitatively the main facts of ﬁrm demography and the emergence of spatio-
temporal patterns for output, growth and failures. The paper is organized as follows.
In Section 2 we ﬁrst describe a framework in which a class of models can be
developed. We then provide a detailed description of a speciﬁc model, pointing out
limitations and simpliﬁcations. In Section 3 we discuss the mechanisms of failure
propagation and in Section 4 we report the results of our computer simulations.
Conclusions are presented in Section 5.
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We ﬁrst outline the organization of the production network (Section 2.1) and the
temporal structure of the events (Section 2.2). We then describe in detail the model
(Sections 2.4–2.9).2.1. Economic environment
The economy consists of N ﬁrms organized in M production levels. We will denote
ﬁrms with indices i; j; k; l; . . . and levels with indices J; K ; L; . . . : We adopt the
convention that production takes place along the vertical axis in downwards
direction. The structure of the connections deﬁnes the production network as in the
example shown in Fig. 1, in which arrows represent supply of goods (supply proceeds
downwards, while money moves upwards).
Each ﬁrm in a level K is supplied by a subset of ﬁrms in the upper level K  1 and
in turn supplies a subset of the ﬁrms in the lower level K þ 1. The bottom level
K ¼ M represents ﬁrms that sell in the consumer market (retailers). The top level




maA ﬁrm asks for inputs from the suppliers in order to produce output.
2. A ﬁrm asks for payments from the customers in order to realize proﬁt.The output of each level K is produced by processing the input from the previous
level K  1. Output is qualitatively different from input. For the sake of simplicity,











where Y i is the output of ﬁrm i, Si is the set of suppliers of ﬁrm i, and Qij represents
the fraction of the total output of ﬁrm j that ﬁrm i uses to produce its own output.. 1. Example of structure for the production network. The direction of production is from top to
tom. Each ﬁrm in a level receives goods from a subset (3 in this case) of ﬁrms from the upper level. The
level consists of primary producers. Layer 3 (from the top) consists of ﬁrms that sell in the consumer
rket (retailers). We have highlighted in dark gray the set of all suppliers upward from a given retailer.
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ij ¼ 1 8j 2 level K  1. (2)
2.2. Timing
We have to model the fact that over time, ﬁrms decide their desired amount of
production, send orders, produce, deliver to customers and pay suppliers. We
assume that time is discrete and divided into periods, each period including the
following events for all ﬁrms: at the beginning of each period (or time step) t, orders
ﬂow upwards; then production and delivery ﬂow downward. At the end of the
period, money ﬂows upward.
In greater detail, at the beginning, all ﬁrms in the bottom level M determine their
desired output, based on the demand they face on the market and their production
capacity, and then send orders to the upper level M  1. Afterwards, all ﬁrms in level
M  1 determine their desired output based on the demand they face from their
customer ﬁrms in level M. One after another, all levels do the same, up to level 1
(primary producers). Once the desired output is known, ﬁrms can compute their
expected output (see Section 2.8), based on the expected output of the suppliers,
which they communicate to the ﬁrms downward. This allows customer ﬁrms to
allocate the necessary resources and premises to process the inputs they will receive.
At this point, production starts in level 1 and proceeds downward one level after
the other, as each ﬁrm needs the input from its suppliers in order to produce. Output
produced by a ﬁrm is delivered to customers on the basis of full trade credit; we rule
out the possibility of inventory accumulation. When production reaches the bottom
level, products are fully sold in the consumer market.
At the end of the period, a sequence of payments proceeds upwards from the
retailers up to the primary producers. At each level, each ﬁrm pays its suppliers
upstream only after having been paid by its customers. If costs exceeds revenues, the
ﬁrm goes bankrupt and does not pay the suppliers in the current period. Moreover,
the ﬁrm stops production for a number t of periods in the future, after which it is
replaced by a new ﬁrm endowed with an assigned initial value of production
capacity. During those t periods, the suppliers of that ﬁrm do not receive orders
from it, nor do the customers receive production from it. Therefore, bankruptcy at
the end of period t results not only in disruption of payments but also in a temporary
local disruption in the production chain which is repaired in period t þ tþ 1.
2.3. Remarks
The structure of the connections does not change during the process. This means
that when a ﬁrm goes bankrupt, its customers do not create new links with other
suppliers. This follows from the assumption of prohibitively high costs of
establishing relations with new suppliers. So far, we have described a general
framework, while the mechanisms involved can be speciﬁed in several ways
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However, some of the results presented in this paper do not depend on the
speciﬁcation of such mechanisms. Therefore, the present structure is a candidate for
a class of models sharing similar behavior, in particular, concerning the conditions
for the occurrence of avalanches of bankruptcies which are analyzed in Section 3. In
the following, we provide a detailed description of a simple version of the model and
a discussion of its limitations. In any period t each ﬁrm i is endowed with a level of
real net worth AiðtÞ, deﬁned as the stock of the ﬁrm’s assets in real terms, that has
been ﬁnanced only through net proﬁts (we assume complete equity rationing).
2.4. Desired output
Firm i at level K determines at time t its desired output, Y
ðd;KÞ
i . This depends on the
orders received from level K þ 1, with the constraint of its production capacity that
we assume to be proportional to net worth A
ðKÞ
i by a constant y40 (as stated in
Eq. (3)). Therefore, capacity is ﬁnancially constrained as, for instance, in Greenwald
and Stiglitz (1993) and in related work by Delli Gatti et al. (2005). As in Greenwald
and Stiglitz we can conceive of yAðKÞi ðtÞ as the optimal (i.e., maximizing expected
proﬁt) output in the presence of bankruptcy costs.
Hence, desired output is deﬁned as follows:
Y
ðd;KÞ










In the equation above, V Ci is the set of customers of ﬁrm i, O
ðK ;Kþ1Þ is the order
matrix describing the orders from level K þ 1 to K, and in particular OðK ;Kþ1Þij is the
fraction of the total supply needed by ﬁrm j that ﬁrm j orders to ﬁrm i. In matrix
notation we can write
Y ðd;KÞðtÞ ¼ minfyAðKÞðtÞ; OðK ;Kþ1ÞY ðd;Kþ1ÞðtÞg. (4)
For level M, we assume that at each time step the consumer market absorbs the
whole production and therefore
Y ðd;MÞðtÞ ¼ yAðKÞðtÞ. (5)
2.5. Expected and effective output
Once the desired output is known at all levels, ﬁrms compute their expected output,
based on the expected output of the suppliers. Here, ‘expected’ has nothing to do
with ‘expectation value’ in statistical sense. A ﬁrm i may not be able to fulﬁll the
orders of its customers, either because they exceed its production capacity or because
the input from its suppliers is insufﬁcient. As a result, supply can be smaller than the
ordered quantity and therefore the expected output of ﬁrm i, Y
ðeÞ
i , can be smaller than
the desired one Y
ðdÞ
i . In this version of the model, ﬁrms have a ﬁxed set of suppliers
(the network structure is static) and they cannot look for new suppliers. However,
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other words, the ways O
ðK ;Kþ1Þ
ij are determined. This is discussed later on and plays
an important role. The production function of ﬁrms is assumed to be linear so that
the output of a ﬁrm in level K is a linear combination of the input received from the
suppliers in level K  1. This yields
Y
ðe;1Þ








ij ðtÞY ðe;K1Þj ðtÞ. (6)
For ﬁrms at level 1, the expected output coincides with the desired one, as they do
not have suppliers. VSi is the set of suppliers of ﬁrm i, Q
ðK ;K1Þ is the input–output
matrix describing the transformation of input from level K  1 into the output of
level K. Each entry Q
ðK ;K1Þ
ij represents the fraction of the total output of ﬁrm j that
ﬁrm i uses to produce its own output. Firms in level 1 are primary producers and
do not need any supply, therefore Y
ðe;1Þ
i ¼ Y ðd;1Þi . In matrix notation, the output of
any level can be expressed as a function of the output of the ﬁrst level as follows:
Y ðe;KÞðtÞ ¼ QðK ;K1ÞðtÞY ðe;K1ÞðtÞ ¼ QðK ;K1ÞðtÞ  . . .  Qð2;1ÞðtÞY ðe;1ÞðtÞ. (7)
The expected output is communicated downward to customers. Any two ﬁrms
engaged in a supplier–customer relation agree on this amount to be delivered and
paid at the end of the period. Customer ﬁrms allocate the necessary resources and
premises to process the expected input they will receive from suppliers.
At this point, we include in the model some occasional production failures (due,
for instance, to technical problems). At each period t, with probability q, the
production of ﬁrm i is lost during the processing and no output is delivered to
customers. This event occurs independently of the ﬁnancial state of ﬁrms i and this






i ðtÞ ¼ Y ðe;KÞi ðtÞSiðtÞ, (8)
where SjðtÞ ¼ 0 with probability q and SjðtÞ ¼ 1 with probability 1 q.
2.6. Production costs
The output produced by ﬁrm i is sold to the customer at the price PiðtÞ (no
inventory accumulation). We can think of the price of a ﬁrm’s output in level K as
PiðtÞ ¼ PðKÞðtÞuiðtÞ where PðKÞðtÞ is the general price at level K and uiðtÞ is the relative
price for the output of the single ﬁrm. We assume that uiðtÞ is a random variable,
uniformly distributed in ½1 dP; 1þ dP and independent of PðKÞðtÞ. Therefore, ﬁrm









ðK1ÞðtÞujðtÞY ðK1Þj . (9)
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ij ðtÞujðtÞY ðK1Þj ðtÞ, ð10Þ
where cs is deﬁned as the ratio of the price levels at level K  1 and K and we assume
it to be the same for all K.
Firm i also incurs a cost associated with the resources used in processing the input
(labor and premises). As for the supply cost, this cost is assumed to be proportional
to the expected output through a constant cr40. We assume that the resources
allocated by the customers of i to process its expected output cannot be dis-allocated
within the current time period. Therefore, in case of a production failure of i, its









ij ðtÞY ðe;K1Þj ðtÞ. (11)
Of course, in the case of a production failure by i, the customers of i do not incur any
supply cost. On the other hand, ﬁrm i not only does not receive any payment but has
also to pay for the input from its suppliers. The production of ﬁrm i resumes at the
next time step, if it has survived the shock. In conclusion, the production cost of ﬁrm
i is the sum of the two terms deﬁned above:
C
ðKÞ
i ðtÞ ¼ Cðs;KÞi ðtÞ þ Cðr;KÞi ðtÞ. (12)
2.7. Profit and bankruptcy
In each period, when output is sold in the consumer market and payments start,
some ﬁrms may realize sales revenue smaller than their supply costs. If this loss is
high enough, ﬁrms go bankrupt and do not pay their suppliers. Therefore, we have
to distinguish between the output delivered by ﬁrm i to its customers, Y iðtÞ, and the
output Y si ðtÞ that is actually paid for (‘s’ for ‘sold’), at price uiðtÞ, to ﬁrm i by its
customers. Proﬁt in real terms is equal to the difference between revenues and costs
in real terms:
pðKÞi ðtÞ ¼ uiðtÞY ðs;KÞi ðtÞ  CðKÞi ðtÞ. (13)




i ðt þ 1Þ ¼ rAðKÞi ðtÞ þ pðKÞi ðtÞ, (14)
where 1 r measures a depreciation rate.
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with 14b40. If a ﬁrm goes bankrupt at time t, it stops supplying customers and paying
suppliers for a number t of time steps (referred to as ‘inactivity time’ in the following).
During these time steps, neighboring ﬁrms are not allowed to look for alternative
customers or suppliers, as the network structure is static. Firms can however (at least in
some of the scenarios considered in the following) adjust their orders as a function of the
production capacity of the suppliers. As this is proportional to net worth, it means that
customers order less and less when a supplier’s net worth decreases. Once the inactivity
time elapsed, the bankrupt ﬁrm is replaced by a new ﬁrm with the same links as its
predecessor and its net worth is re-initialized: Aðt þ tþ 1Þ ¼ Aentry.
2.8. Responsiveness of firms to supply failure
Whenever a supplier j unexpectedly does not deliver its input to ﬁrm i, the ﬁrm may
not be able to reduce immediately the resources (labor and premises) that it had
allocated to process such input. This depends of course on the labor regulations of the
country and the industrial sector. In this paper, we shall consider only two simple
scenarios at the extreme ends of the range of responsiveness of the ﬁrm. Suppose, for
instance, that the supplier j goes bankrupt at time t and does not deliver any input to i
at time steps t þ 1; . . . ; t þ t. If ﬁrm i is not able to adapt its resources to the new
input, then at time steps t þ 1; . . . ; t þ t it will incur a cost proportional to the input it
received from j at time t. If the ﬁrm is adaptive, it will not run any cost in relation to j.
In conclusion, in the ﬁrst scenario, the costs associated with resources are
C
ðr;KÞ

















where t0 is the time step at which j went bankrupt (the last time). In the second
scenario, it holds Eq. (11).
2.9. Strategies for placing orders and delivery
Although the network is static in this version of the model, and therefore the set of
suppliers of a ﬁrm is ﬁxed, still there are many possible ways to allocate orders to the
suppliers. Consistently with our bounded rationality framework, we consider two
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Strategy 1 stimulates the growth of all the suppliers of a ﬁrm and tends to keep a
balanced portfolio of suppliers, while strategy 2 favors the largest supplier, so that in
the long run ﬁrms tend to have only one main supplier.
As explained in Section 2.5, in our simple setting it may occur that a supplier
cannot fulﬁll the demands of its customers. In this case, several ways of allocating the
delivery are possible and here we consider the following simple strategy:1. Firm j delivers to each customer l in proportion to its order, relative to the orders






ij ðtÞY ðK1Þj ðtÞP
l2VCj O
ðK ;Kþ1Þ
lj ðtÞY ðK1Þj ðtÞ
. (19)
The equation above satisﬁes the condition of Eq. (2).3. Analysis of the model
3.1. Growth
In this section we discuss the conditions that result in positive average growth
across ﬁrms. For sake of simplicity, for this approximated calculation, we consider a
two-layer network and we assume that prices are ﬁxed ðuiðtÞ ¼ 1 8i; tÞ.
We can then write the supply cost for ﬁrm i as
C
ðs;KÞ





ij ðtÞY ðtÞðK1Þj ¼ csY ðtÞðKÞi . (20)
Because each supplier j of ﬁrm i fails with probability q, its output is, on average,
Y
ðK1Þ














This is a mean ﬁeld approximation, in which we have replaced a ﬂuctuating term
with its average. When demand equals (or exceeds) supply (see Eq. (3)), we have
Y
ðKÞ
i ðtÞ ¼ yAiðtÞðKÞ (where y can be assumed to equal 1 without loss of generality).
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Eqs. (12) and (13), we can rewrite Eq. (14) as














rþ 1 cs þ
cr
ð1 qÞ41 ! r4cs þ
cr
ð1 qÞ . (24)
Not surprisingly, the condition requires that the sum of the parameters related to
cost is smaller than the depreciation factor. Let us now consider the aggregate














Notice that GðtÞ is not the same as gðtÞ. Moreover, as discussed in the results sections,
the model generates heterogeneous ﬁrm size, which does not follow Gaussian
statistics (not even in log scale). As a consequence, it is not possible to easily deduce a
condition for the aggregate growth, GðtÞ, to be positive. For instance, if most ﬁrms
have negative growth but the few largest ﬁrms have positive growth, it is possible to
have negative average growth of ﬁrms (Eq. (23)) and yet positive growth in the
aggregate (Eq. (25)).
3.2. Propagation of bankruptcies
In this section we want to make clear the distinction between the effect of a
bankruptcy on the output of suppliers/customers and its effect on the probability of
bankruptcy of these ﬁrms. A bankruptcy, or simply the change in output of a ﬁrm,
affects the output of its customers (because they need its input to produce). However,
their probability of going bankrupt is not necessarily increased. Let us introduce the
notion of bankruptcy avalanche. By avalanche of events B we mean a process in
which one event of type B at time t in ﬁrm i determines with a certain probability an
event of the same type in each of the connected ﬁrms. This implies that after a few
time steps, a number a of events B has occurred (a is also called the ‘size’ of the
avalanche).
The production network modelled in this paper is represented by a directed graph
in which the direction of the edges follows the direction of production. However,
bankruptcies can propagate in the same direction as production or in the opposite
one. We will speak of downward or upward propagation, respectively. If bankruptcies
can propagate only downward/upward, when they reach the bottom/top level they
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downward/upward of the initial bankruptcies.
If bankruptcies can propagate simultaneously in both directions, then, and only
then, are they ‘reﬂected’ diagonally at each level and the result is a net horizontal
propagation that is perpendicular to the direction of production (Fig. 2(c,d)). In the
following we will speak of horizontal bankruptcy propagation to mean the situation in
which bankruptcies can propagate potentially to the whole network and not only to
the downward/upward cone of ﬁrms.
In our model, bankruptcies occur when the ratio of proﬁt and net worth becomes
smaller than a negative threshold, pi=Aio b. If the real price of sale for ﬁrm i, uiðtÞ,
is a stochastic variable with the probability distribution function mðuiÞ, we can write
the probability PBi of bankruptcy for ﬁrm i as follows (to keep notation simple, the
level K of the ﬁrm is not indicated):
PBi ¼ PfpiðtÞo bAiðtÞg
















Fig. 2. Different modalities of failure propagation. Edges through which failure propagate are in darker
gray. The ﬁrm triggering the avalanche is represented by the node in dark gray. (a,b) Downward and
upward propagation of failures. (c,d) Horizontal propagation occurs when each level transmits downward
but also reﬂects upwards. In panel c failures have propagated up to two degrees of separation from the
initial ﬁrm; in panel d up to three degrees.
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a uniform distribution in ½1 dP; 1þ dP, Eq. (26) yields
PBi ¼
ui ðtÞ þ dP  1
2dP
. (27)
Notice that, as expected, PBi ¼ 0 if ui ¼ 1 d and that PBi increases when the cost




In a regime in which supply equals demand, and neglecting ﬂuctuations of supply




’ ðcr  b=yÞY
e
i ðtÞ þ csY iðtÞ
Y si ðtÞ
. (28)
From the equation above we can deduce some conditions under which the
bankruptcy (and in general the failure of supply and payments) of a ﬁrm affects the
probability that a connected ﬁrm goes bankrupt.
Notice that if payments are delayed, we cannot replace Y si ðtÞ with Y iðtÞ in the
equation, because if some customers go bankrupt at time t, then Y si ðtÞoY iðtÞ.
Moreover, if ﬁrms cannot adapt the cost for resources within one time step (as
assumed in the model), we cannot replace Y ei ðtÞ with Y iðtÞ, because in case of supply
failure it holds Y ei ðtÞ4Y iðtÞ. Therefore, in this case, the probability that ﬁrm i will go
bankrupt is affected both by bankruptcies of customers as well as suppliers, and
bankruptcies can propagate both upward and downward.
In contrast, if payments are anticipated and ﬁrms can instantly adapt their
resources to the input received, then the simpliﬁcations mentioned above are
legitimate and Eq. (28) becomes
ui ðtÞ ¼ ðcr  b=yÞ þ cs (29)
which implies that the probability of bankruptcy for ﬁrm i is a constant, and in
particular it is independent of what happens to suppliers and customers. In this case
there is no propagation of bankruptcies at all.
As intermediate situations, we have:1. If payments are delayed but ﬁrms are adaptive within one period, then ﬁrms are
only sensitive to bankruptcies of customers and therefore bankruptcies can
propagate only upward.2. If payments are anticipated but ﬁrms are not adaptive within one period, then
ﬁrms are only sensitive to bankruptcies of suppliers and therefore bankruptcies
can propagate only downwards.
Finally, let us consider Eq. (29) in the case of ﬁxed prices uiðtÞ ¼ 1 8i; t, which
implies that all ﬁrms go bankrupt if
1oðcr  b=yÞ þ cs. (30)
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Within the scope of the decision making scenarios investigated in this paper, the
effect of the network structure can be predicted very simply, yet such scenarios are
still too simpliﬁed to offer interesting insights for policy. For instance, in scenario 1,
ﬁrms would beneﬁt from a high connectivity degree (the number of outgoing and
ingoing edges in the graph of Fig. 1). This is because the loss of proﬁt due to the
bankruptcy of a supplier or a customer is of order of 1=ki, where ki is the
connectivity degree of ﬁrm i. In particular, for any set of values of the parameters
b; y; cs; cr, the connectivity degree could be set large enough to reduce arbitrarily
close to zero the probability that a bankruptcy could induce other bankruptcies. In
scenario 2, ﬁrms would always end up with one main supplier, no matter how many
they are possibly connected to. But they would also beneﬁt from a high connectivity
degree because in case of the bankruptcy of a supplier, they would have better
chances of being able to re-allocate their order to a supplier with a large enough
production capacity. The investigation of the role of the structure of the network on
the propagation of bankruptcies is left for further developments which will include
more realistic order allocation strategies.4. Analysis of simulation results
We now present the results of computer simulations of the model described above
with the following speciﬁcations which are valid for all the simulations, unless
otherwise mentioned. The structure of the network is the one illustrated in Fig. 1,
with three suppliers and three customers per ﬁrm. Price distribution is uniform in the
interval ½1 dP; 1þ dP. We are interested in a regime in which ﬁrms’ proﬁt is
sensitive to unexpected variations of input from suppliers. For this to be, proﬁt
variations due to stochastic price ﬂuctuation must not be larger than those due to the
variation of input, that is, dP must be relatively small. The generic features displayed
by the model include:1. Spatio-temporal correlation of output, growth and bankruptcies.
2. Exponential growth.
3. Oscillations of de-trended aggregate output.
4. Heterogeneous ﬁrm size distribution.
5. Exponential probability distribution of aggregate growth (right side).As mentioned in Section 2.8, in this paper we consider two simple scenarios for
the decision-making process of the ﬁrm. The model displays the same general
features in the two scenarios, but, as discussed in Section 4.2, the strategy for
order allocation affects the bankruptcy avalanches, as well as the distribution of
output and aggregate growth. On the other hand, introducing a varying interest rate
also has a very signiﬁcant impact on the dynamics of the system, as discussed in
Section 4.3.
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The parameters of the model can be grouped as follows.1. Size of the network and time span: number of ﬁrms N, number of levels M in the
economy, number of time steps T. We test M between 3 and 5, a range which is
close to real production networks. We have performed simulations with N of the
order of a thousand and T up to a few thousands.2. Prices, production failure and costs: price interval width dP, production failure
probability q, supply cost factor cs. Unless speciﬁed otherwise, results reported in
this paper are obtained with dP ¼ 0:2, q ¼ 0:02, cs ¼ cr ¼ 0:35.3. Bankruptcy and rebirth: inactivity time is set as t ¼ 3. Firms are initially all
endowed with the same value of net worth Aið0Þ ¼ Ainit ¼ 1 8i and output
Y ið0Þ ¼ Y init ¼ 1 8i. Because the total level of net worth is not constant (the
economy grows or recedes depending on the parameters at point 2), the entry level
of net worth Aentry is set to be proportional to the average value of net worth
across ﬁrms, A¯ : Aentry ¼ 101A¯. The bankruptcy threshold is set as b ¼ 0:2. The
depreciation factor is set as r ¼ 0:97 (which yields a depreciation rate
1 r ¼ 3%).
4.2. Scenarios 1– 2
In a ﬁrst set of simulations (scenario 1) ﬁrms are not able to adapt their resources
when a supplier goes bankrupt. Both the structure and the intensity of the
connections are static in this case. Correspondingly, for allocation of orders, they use
strategy 1, which is blind to the production capacity of the suppliers and also to their
bankruptcies, which means that ﬁrms keep allocating one-third of their orders to
each supplier regardless of its activity status.
In a second set of simulations (scenario 2), ﬁrms can adapt their resources when a
supplier goes bankrupt, so they do not incur costs during the inactivity time of the
supplier. Moreover, ﬁrms adapt orders to the production capacity of the suppliers
(strategy 2 for order allocation), which implies that although the structure of the
network is still static, the intensity of the links is now changing over time. In both
sets of simulations parameters are set as in Section 4.1.
One of the main features of this model is the emergence of correlations in time
between output and growth of connected ﬁrms. In this respect, it is more illustrative
to display examples of the emerging patterns, rather than the plot of the correlation
function. In Fig. 3, the evolution of output over the production network in scenario
1 is shown in an interval of 20 time steps. Each frame represents the production
network at a given time step. Primary producers are in the leftmost level of each
frame. Retailers in the consumer market are in the rightmost level of each frame.
Output is normalized by the maximum value of output at each time step in order to
emphasize the relative spatial distribution of output. Output is represented by a gray
scale as speciﬁed by the color bar. Dark gray represents output close to 0 while black
















Fig. 3. Time evolution of output of the production network. Zoom on a time interval and in a region of
the network. Each column represents the production network at a given time step: the x-axis represents
production level while the y-axis represents ﬁrm’s position in the network. Primary producers are in the
leftmost side of each column. Retailers on the consumer market are in the rightmost side of each column.
Output is normalized by the maximum value of the output at each time step and represented with a gray
scale. Dark gray represents output close to 0 while black represents bankruptcy. Propagation of failures is
observed (see text for more details).
S. Battiston et al. / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 31 (2007) 2061–2084 2077soon regions of high output emerge while other collapse. In particular, following the
position of the black cells from one frame to the next, it is possible to observe the
propagation of bankruptcies over time. For instance, at time 40, the bankruptcy of
ﬁrm in position 18 of the third level induces the bankruptcy at time 41 of some
customer ﬁrms (positions 19,18,17 in the fourth level). A little avalanche is triggered
and propagates perpendicularly to the direction of production), until it overlaps at
time 46 with another avalanche which at time 40 was concerning ﬁrms 9–13.
When ﬁrms’ orders are adaptive (scenario 2) bankruptcy avalanches tend to be
smaller (Fig. 4) and output tend to be concentrated in thinner channels. Adaptive
orders result in ﬁrms relaying mostly on one supplier.
Similarly to what is shown for the output of the network, Fig. 5 shows a zoom of
the time evolution of growth of ﬁrms in scenario 1. Growth of ﬁrms is measured as
ðAiðt þ 1Þ  AiðtÞÞ=AiðtÞ. However, for sake of visualization values larger than 0.1
have been set to 0.1 and values smaller than 0.1 have been set to 0.1. Moreover,
bankrupted ﬁrms are represented in black. We observe that values of growth of
neighboring ﬁrms tend to be correlated in time. Interestingly, if we look at the
aggregate growth, as deﬁned in Eq. (25), we can observe phases of growth above the
average, alternating with phases of growth below the average (Fig. 6).
Growth of aggregate output follows an exponential trend as shown in Fig. 7 for
both scenarios 1 and 2. In the ﬁrst scenario, growth is smaller than in the second,
mainly due to the resource cost that ﬁrms incur when suppliers go bankrupt.
Moreover, the order allocation strategy implies that except when supplies equal
demand, part of the orders are systematically not fulﬁlled. Strategy 2 for order
allocation is not a good strategy, absolutely speaking. It is better than a blind
strategy such as strategy 1, but more sophisticated strategies could be designed and
compared. In particular, strategy 2 leads to supply chains where each ﬁrm has
















Fig. 5. Time evolution of growth of the production network in scenario 1. Zoom on a time interval. The
ﬁgure is obtained as described in Fig. 3.
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Fig. 6. Time evolution of aggregate growth with strategies 1 and 2 for order allocation. The dashed line















Fig. 4. Time evolution of output of the production network in scenario 2 (strategy 2 for order allocation).
The ﬁgure is obtained as described in Fig. 3.
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Fig. 8. Time evolution of de-trended aggregate output with strategies 1 and 2 for order allocation (see
text).
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Fig. 7. Time evolution of logarithm in base 10 of aggregate output with strategies 1 and 2 for order
allocation.
S. Battiston et al. / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 31 (2007) 2061–2084 2079some diversity in the portfolio of suppliers. However, a more sophisticated strategy
for allocating orders requires ﬁrms to know how much production capacity is left to
each supplier, which in turn requires a non-synchronous allocation of orders and
therefore a different setting for the model. The aim of the present work is only to
show that order allocation strategies do affect the aggregate output and growth.
The de-trended aggregate output, Y detr, is obtained as the difference between the
time series of the logarithm in base 10 of the aggregate output and the linear ﬁt of the
time series itself:
YdetrðtÞ ¼ log10ðY totðtÞÞ  bt þ a, (31)
where b and a are the coefﬁcients obtained with linear ﬁt. Fig. 8 refers to scenario 2
and shows irregular oscillations of a few percent.
In scenario 2, we ﬁnd that the right part of the distribution of aggregate growth
over time is exponential, while the left part does not display a deﬁnite trend (as
shown in Fig. 9a). The constant of the exponential decay depends on the parameter
setting, but the trend is robust across the parameter range. A similar distribution is
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Fig. 9. (a) Probability distribution of growth of aggregate output over time. (b) Complementary
cumulative probability distribution of output across ﬁrms in the network. Strategy 2 for order allocation
gives rise to a power low tail with exponent 2.02. Strategy 1 gives raise to a less heterogeneous distribution.
S. Battiston et al. / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 31 (2007) 2061–20842080also found for the distribution of growth across ﬁrms (not shown). In contrast,
empirical works have found that growth follows a Laplace distribution (Delli Gatti
et al., 2005), which is a symmetric exponential distribution. Therefore, some further
analytical work is needed to understand to origin of this discrepancy.
The heterogeneity of output across ﬁrms is measured by the complementary
cumulative distribution. As we observe in Fig. 9b, the order allocation strategy also
affects the shape of output distribution. As expected, strategy 1 gives rise to a less
heterogeneous distribution than strategy 2. In particular, with strategy 2 the right tail
of the distribution follows a power law with exponent 2.02. The value of the
exponent, which is consistent with empirical values for size distribution of ﬁrms,
was found not to be critically sensitive to the range of values of the parameters.
A thorough investigation of the dependence of such exponent from the parameters is
beyond the scope of this paper.
4.3. Scenario 3: impact of dynamic interest rate
We want now to explore, albeit in a very preliminary way, the potential impact of
endogenously determined interest rate changes on the dynamics of the system. When
a borrowing ﬁrm goes bankrupt, the non-performing loan negatively affects the
lender’s balance sheet. The lender, in turn, could react by pushing up the interest rate
charged to other borrowers in an effort to offset the potential loss. In order to
capture this effect, we assume that an increase in bankruptcy risk leads to an increase
in interest rate and therefore in production costs. Therefore, the production cost for
ﬁrm i must be multiplied by the factor
1þ Zloc
P































Fig. 10. Time evolution of output of the production network in scenario 3 (strategy 2 for order allocation
and dynamic interest rate). The ﬁgure is obtained as described in Fig. 3.





















Fig. 11. Time evolution of logarithm in base 10 of aggregate output in scenario 3.
S. Battiston et al. / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 31 (2007) 2061–2084 2081where parameters Zloc and Zglob measure the inﬂuence of bankruptcies in the
neighborhood and in the whole network, respectively. The second term in Eq. (32)
represents the fraction of output lost because of the bankruptcies among ﬁrms
connected to i. Y jðtj Þ is the value of the output of ﬁrm j at the moment when it went
bankrupt. The third term in the equation concerns the output lost because of
bankruptcies everywhere in the network.
We present the results of a third set of simulations (scenario 3) in which the order
strategy is as in scenario 2, while production costs are affected, as described above,
by bankruptcies in the neighborhood and/or everywhere in the network. In scenario
2, ﬁrms are adaptive and occasional bankruptcies would not give rise to signiﬁcant
avalanches. However, in the presence of a strong enough local and global impact on
the interest rate (Zloc and Zglob equal 1.25 and 0.75, respectively), we observe that
some bankruptcies trigger local avalanches, which in turn facilitate the onset of
bankruptcies elsewhere in the network (Fig. 10).
The aggregate output is still exponentially growing in time, but is characterized by
phases of higher and lower growth (Fig. 11), which is also visible in the de-trended
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Fig. 12. Time evolution of de-trended aggregate output in scenario 3.













Fig. 13. Time evolution of aggregate growth in scenario 3. The dashed line represents the average over
time.
S. Battiston et al. / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 31 (2007) 2061–20842082output (Fig. 12) and in the aggregate growth (Fig. 13). Overall, the dynamics of the
interest rate induces endogenously the onset of oscillations and instabilities in the
system.5. Conclusions
In this paper we have developed a general framework to represent a networked
economy in order to explore the effects of local interaction among ﬁrms connected
by production and credit ties. The framework can yield avalanches of bankruptcies
in the presence of delayed payments (trade credit) and costs due to failures in supply.
Previous models ignore local interaction so that the propagation of bankruptcies is
activated only by means of global coupling: the more ﬁrms fail, the higher the
interest rate for all, hence the more they fail. Therefore, this paper provides a novel
and alternative mechanism for the propagation of failures.
Within the proposed framework, we have implemented and simulated a speciﬁc
model in which ﬂuctuations of aggregate output – around a trend of exponential
growth – emerge from the evolution in space and over time of the local interaction
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straightforward way. The calibration and validation of the model in the light of real
world data is an issue to be dealt with accurately in a follow up of the present paper.
Adjusting the interaction rules assumed in the model, it is possible to investigate
the role of the main factors involved in models of ﬁnancial fragility and address the
following issues:(1) The role of trade–credit relationships in the propagation of bankruptcies.
(2) The role of interest rate and policies to prevent the occurrence of large
avalanches.
(3) The role of the structure of the network of interactions.
(4) Policies to make such structure more robust against large avalanches.In this paper we have started addressing the ﬁrst two issues. In future
developments we will address the third one and further investigate the ﬁrst two. In
conclusion, we believe that this framework opens the way to a novel class of models
for endogenous business ﬂuctuations based on ﬁrm–ﬁrm interaction and trade–credit
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